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INFORMAL FINANCE AND FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION IN EL SALVADOR 
Abstract 
Recent empirical evidence from El Salvador indicates that informal finance plays a 
significant role in the provision of credit services, and is well integrated with the formal 
financial sector. The effectiveness of monetary policy is not likely to be hindered by 
informal financial activity. 
INFORMAL FINANCE AND FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION IN EL SALVADOR 
by 
Carlos E. Cuevas and Douglas H. Graham 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Informal financial markets have received increasing attention in recent years. In 
addition to their evident prevalence in Africa, informal financial intermediaries play 
significant roles in the economies of Latin America and Asia (Adams and Fitchett, 
Chandavarkar). Researchers and policy makers are concerned with the relative importance 
of informal finance in overall financial markets, the roles informal intermediation play in 
developing countries, and the implications of informal financial activity for financial market 
development, and for the effectiveness of financial and monetary policy. This paper 
contributes empirical evidence and analytical insights into these concerns from an extensive 
survey carried out in El Salvador (Cuevas, Graham, and Paxton). 
During the 1980s, the Salvadoran economy suffered a decline due to political turmoil, 
the international recession and misdirected economic policies. The banking system was 
nationalized in 1980, artificially low interest rates were maintained by government banks 
through directed credit programs to stimulate investment. These interest rates were 
outpaced by inflation, resulting in negative real interest rates and a contraction of the 
volume of loanable resources. Tight monetary programming caused by persistent fiscal 
deficits and the use of rediscount facilities led to a decline in the volume of real credit 
granted to the private sector. 
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Data indicate that due to the repressive regulatory environment, informal financial 
intermediation expanded during this period to compensate for the deficiencies of the 
banking system. Evidence of this increase in informal financial activity is exemplified by the 
fact that growth rates in real GDP have occurred in spite of a contraction in the real volume 
of formal sector credit to the private sector. This indicates that enterprises obtained 
resources through self-financing and/or from informal intermediaries rather than borrowing 
from formal institutions. These indirect signals motivated the comprehensive study of 
informal financial markets that provides the basic data for this paper. 
A brief description of the study methods and data is presented first. A discussion of 
the roles and significance of informal finance, and their implications for monetary policy 
follows. Concluding remarks are offered in the last section of the paper. 
II. METHODS AND DATA 
The findings analyzed here derive from some 2,000 interviews with different partici-
pants in informal financial markets throughout the country. Rural and urban households, 
enterprises, cooperatives, and individual informal financial intermediaries comprise the 
populations under analysis. In the users/urban household sector, 500 interviews were 
conducted in the metropolitan area of San Salvador, and in the major cities. Sampling 
among these populations followed a multi-stage method based on cartographic and census 
information. A cluster sample technique was used to select 700 rural households. A sample 
frame available at the Salvadoran Foundation for Economics and Social Development 
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(FUSADES) served as the basis for selecting 400 enterprises stratified by size in four 
categories: micro, small, medium, and large. 
Informal financial intermediaries are by definition not regulated by the monetary 
authorities, and not registered with any entity which could provide a sample frame for these 
intermediaries. Hence, informal intermediaries were interviewed as they were identified by 
users of financial services, households or enterprises. These informal intermediaries were 
a priori classified into three categories: (a), enterprises/intermediaries, i.e., non-financial 
firms providing lending and/or deposit services (250 interviews); (b), informal groups, 
associations or unions (50 interviews); and (c), individual intermediaries (100 interviews). 
The questionnaires used with each market participant documented the composition 
of their liability and asset portfolio, and the terms and conditions of financial transactions 
associated with each portfolio component. The identification of contracting partners allowed 
the assessment of the relative importance and role of informal financial intermediation, as 
well as the evaluation of the extent of market integration with the formal financial system. 
III. THE ROLE OF INFORMAL FINANCE 
This analysis of the relative importance of informal finance focuses on two closely 
related aspects: the social relevance of informal financial services, and the economic 
significance of informal intermediation. The first issue is discussed in terms of access to 
financial services by households and enterprises, while the second area of analysis looks into 
the magnitude of the liquidity flows circulating informally, and the pricing of financial 
services in the informal financial market. 
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A. The Social Role of Informal Finance: Access to Financial Services 
The informal financial sector is the principal source of credit for all types of users 
identified in this study. This includes not only rural and urban households and enterprises, 
but also the informal intermediaries themselves (enterprises, cooperatives and individuals). 
The rural sector is where the presence of informal intermediaries acquires the highest 
significance. While at least 45 percent of the rural households do not have access to any 
source of loanable funds, informal loans represent 81 percent of the credit transactions 
effectively performed. Among urban households, of which at least 26 percent do not have 
access to credit of any sort, informal credit transactions account for 78 percent of total loan 
transactions. This proportion grows to 81 percent for low-income urban dwellers, while in 
the upper-middle class urban sector informal loans represent three-fourths of all credit 
transactions. 
Finally, at least 70 percent of the enterprise-users obtain loans from informal sources, 
notably suppliers. Among these enterprises, the mix of (relatively soft) supplier-credit, and 
purely informal loans (relatively more expensive) declines as the enterprise size diminishes. 
In other words, although overall access to informal loans is fairly uniform across enterprise 
sizes, the proportion of loans associated with well established business relationships (supplier 
credit) increases as enterprise size increases. While about 56 percent of the microenter-
prises in our user sample received supplier loans, almost 90 percent of the large enterprises 
had access to this stable, low-cost form of informal credit. 
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As for the informal intermediaries interviewed in our survey, access to informal 
sources of funds clearly outweighs their use of institutional credit. At least 80 percent of 
the enterprise-intermediaries, and more than likely all of them, had loans from informal 
sources, again dominated by supplier credit. More than one-half of the loans obtained from 
cooperatives were supplied by informal sources, while the share of these sources in all loans 
received by individual financial intermediaries (IFis) was 81 percent, i.e., comparable to that 
of rural households indicated above. 
Institutional credit is only a relevant source of funds for enterprises - about 45 
percent of the enterprises had access to these formal sources. The incidence of institutional 
credit incidence among households does not exceed 18 percent of the sample. Moreover, 
formal loans appear concentrated in large, collateral-rich firms, while informal loans are 
more significant in the portfolio of smaller enterprises and households, underscoring the 
social relevance of informal intermediation in the provision of credit services. Deposit 
services, contrary to credit services, are provided primarily by the formal financial system, 
notably banks. 
The preceding remarks summanze the typical asymmetry observed in financial 
markets in developing countries. Where information is crucial, i.e., in the provision of credit 
services, informal finance stands out as the sector with clear comparative advantage, while 
formal institutions minimize transaction costs through focusing on large, secured loans to 
enterprises. 
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B. The Economic Role of Informal Finance: Debt and Asset Portfolio of Users, and 
the Pricing of Financial Services 
1. Informal Finance in the Users' Portfolio 
Assuming the risks inherent in all extrapolations, Table 1 presents a summary of the 
liability and asset portfolio of all users of financial services combined. The extrapolation 
takes into account the different proportions of the total population accounted for by our 
sample. Sample proportions were estimated on the basis of population statistics for El 
Salvador, average household sizes of 5.2 and 4.7 inhabitants per household for rural and 
urban areas, respectively, and the effective number of interviews undertaken in each sector. 
The importance of the extrapolation in Table 1 is to put in perspective the real 
incidence of informal finance in terms of overall monetary balances. The overall incidence 
of informal credit in the debt portfolio of all users combined reported in Table 1 is indeed 
about 30 percent. This overall incidence is less than that of institutional credit - 70 percent, 
or that of banks alone - 54 percent of total user's debt. 
On the asset side, informal lending compares well with deposit holdings as primary 
assets in the overall portfolio of users. Forty-five percent of the estimated total users' 
financial assets are represented by informal loans to others, while 55 percent of these assets 
are held in bank deposits. 
It must be kept in mind that Table 1 corresponds to a measure of overall monetary 
circulation, rather than to a "consolidated" balance sheet of all households and enterprises, 
consolidation our data do not allow. However, with this caveat in mind, it is possible to 
conclude that the relative economic importance of informal finance, i.e., in terms of 
monetary balances held by households and enterprises, is substantial. This relative 
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incidence, although less dramatic than that indicated above as social relevance, i.e., in terms 
of numbers of users, cannot be neglected or overlooked. Almost one-third of the debt, and 
almost one-half of total financial assets represent a significant incidence of informal finance. 
For every 100 colones of deposits in the banking system there are 86 colones in informal 
loans in the economy. For every 100 colones of bank credit outstanding, there are 55 
colones of informal debt, of which 51 colones are owed to enterprises. 
The extent to which the presence of the informal financial sector represents a major 
obstacle for policy makers, and a big question mark in policy effectiveness not only depends 
on the relative magnitude of the liquidity circulating informally, but also on the degree of 
isolation or fragmentation existing between the informal and the formal system. Informal 
finance represents a serious policy-making constraint if informal liquidity stays informal and 
does not "cross the bridge" to the banking system. When there is no transmission of policy 
impact from the formal sector to the informal sector, a dual structure of financial prices 
emerges reflecting the fragmentation of the overall financial market, as financial market 
participants are enclosed in their respective market cells. 
In El Salvador, informal finance appears to be well connected with the formal 
(institutional) financial sector, thus reducing the danger of policy ineffectiveness that could 
otherwise be associated with a significant presence of informal finance. Two indications of 
this apparent integration are evident. First, the degree of market integration in the pricin& 
of financial services is apparent and secondly, the interaction, or linka~es. between partici-
pants in informal markets and formal financial institutions is substantial, as will be docu-
mented below. 
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2. Pricing of Financial Services 
The analysis of prices of financial services focuses on the terms and conditions of 
formal and informal loans. Three characteristics of formal and informal loan contracts are 
contrasted here to evaluate the degree of market integration: the interest rate charged on 
loans, the term structure of loans, and the collateral requirements of these loan contracts. 
The overall ranges (minimum to maximum values) are reported in Figures 1 through 3. 
Figure 1 displays the ranges of interest rates on formal and informal loans by borrower 
category, while Figure 2 does the same for the term structure of these loans. Figure 3 
compares collateral requirements between formal and informal loans for different borrower 
categories by looking at the frequencies of the two extreme cases: mortgage collateral 
required as loan guarantee, and no collateral at all. 
The general impression obtained from Figures 1 through 3 is that formal and 
informal markets appear fairly integrated (i.e., the ranges overlap) in terms of interest rate 
conditions and term structure, while showing a sharp degree of fragmentation (i.e., segment-
ed ranges) in terms of collateral requirements. Not surprisingly, interest rates on formal 
loans fluctuate within a range narrower than that displayed by informal loans in Figure 1 
due to interest-rate controls in the Salvadoran financial system, while interest rates charged 
on informal loans fully overlap the range of formal sector rates, and invariably go beyond 
these to reach substantially high rates (with the sole exception of one borrower group). 
Without a measure of the concentration of loan transactions over these ranges of 
interest rates, conclusions are necessarily limited. The shaded areas in Figure 1 indicate, 
however, that borrowers from informal sources are exposed to substantially higher costs of 
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credit. The sectors relying more heavily on informal sources, such as rural households, are 
likely to be forced to borrow informally at these higher rates more often than other sectors 
where access to institutional credit is less restricted, such as enterprises. 
The coincidence of term structures of informal and formal loans is clearly displayed 
in Figure 2. For all borrowers, there is a broad range of term lengths where formal and 
informal loans overlap. In this case however, contrary to the pattern observed for interest 
rates, the term structure of informal loans is consistently shorter than that associated with 
formal credit, for all borrower categories. 
Market fragmentation between formal and informal financial transactions appears 
strikingly clear when collateral conditions are contrasted in Figure 3. Mortgage collateral 
is a highly frequent requirement in formal loans, while the proportion of credit contracts 
with no collateral in this sector is minimal. In contrast, loans with no collateral require-
ments are predominant in informal credit transactions. This pattern is not unusual in 
financial markets in developing countries. The informational advantages enjoyed by 
informal lenders translate into reduced physical collateral requirements, acceptance of a 
variety of collateral substitutes such as co-signatures or group-guarantees, and a widespread 
practice of "character" lending. 
Overall, formal and informal loan transactions appear to share similar ranges of 
values for interest rates and term lengths of contracts, both signs of fairly integrated 
markets. The dichotomy of collateral requirements highlighted above reflects more the 
differences in information quality and information costs faced by formal lenders as com-
pared to informal sources of credit. 
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In summary, a potential borrower in the informal market should expect higher 
interest rate costs, and shorter terms than comparable loans in the formal sector. However, 
the collateral conditions are likely to be substantially less strict, a feature that represents the 
difference between access and no-access to credit for large segments of the population. 
IV. INFORMAL FINANCE, AND FORMAL FINANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MONETARY POLICY 
The relationships between informal finance and the formal financial sector in El 
Salvador are based on two strong inter-sectoral links: first, the role of households holding 
formal deposits while actively borrowing in the informal sector, and second, the crucial role 
in informal lending played by enterprises drawing the majority of their funds from the 
formal sector. 
As summarized in Table 1, rural households as well as urban households are net 
debtors in the informal sector, i.e., their liabilities with informal sources outweigh the value 
of assets held in informal transactions. On the other hand, rural households and to a 
greater extent urban households are net creditors in the formal sector. The amounts held 
in financial assets at formal institutions exceed the outstanding debt balances with these 
institutions. This is a very significant imbalance which can be better described by taking the 
overall ratio of bank deposits held by households, over bank loans received by these 
households. This ratio is computed in Table 2 for the aggregate household sector (line 1), 
using the figures reported in Table 1. The magnitude of this ratio indicates that for every 
col6n of credit received from banks, households hold 17.38 colones in bank deposits. 
11 
Enterprises, both those classified as users as well as those identified as intermediar-
ies, show a net debtor position in the formal sector, and a net creditor position in the 
informal sector, attained primarily through their significant activity in sales on credit and 
consignment. These net positions are summarized for the population of enterprise-users by 
the ratios reported in Table 2, lines 1 and 2. 1 Enterprises hold as bank deposits less than 
40 percent of the total amount of their bank debt (line 1). In contrast, they lend informally 
one-and-a-half times the amount of funds they borrow informally (line 2), a ratio that grows 
to almost 5 to 1 when the subset of enterprise-intermediaries is considered (see Table 2, 
footnote). 
Most interestingly, turning now to the inter-sectoral linkages between formal and 
informal finance through households and enterprises, lines 3 and 4 in Table 2 show the 
ratios of bank deposits held to informal loans received, and of informal credit granted to 
bank loans received, respectively. While the 14 to 1 ratio observed for households in line 
3 confirms their preference for bank instruments in their asset portfolio, the ratio displayed 
by enterprises (0.69 to 1) indicates their preference for informal lending as primary asset. 
The ratio of informal credit granted to bank loans received reaches 2.8 to 1 for 
enterprise-intermediaries (Table 2, footnote). This is to say, for every 100 colones in 
outstanding debt with banks, these enterprises hold 280 colones in assets in the informal 
sector, a proportion about three times higher than that measured for enterprise-users (Table 
2, line 4 ). This contrast in the magnitude of liquidity transfer carried out by enterprises 
The corresponding ratios for enterprise-intermediaries are reported as a footnote to this table, since a 
weighted average for all enterprises is impossible to calculate not knowing the population size for 
enterprise-intermediaries. 
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suggests an indicator by which enterprises could be categorized as users vis a vis intermedi-
aries. A further insight into this distinction is offered below. 
* The role of enterprises as financial intermediaries can be set forth even more clearly 
if one computes the ratio between net informal credit ~ranted (i.e., the amount of informal 
loans granted minus the amounts borrowed in informal transactions) over the net debtor 
position with banks (i.e., amounts borrowed from banks less deposits balances held with 
banks) for both enterprise-users and enterprise-intermediaries. The ratio obtained for 
enterprise-users is 0.46 to 1, i.e., for every 100 colones in net debt with banks (after deduct-
ing their deposit balances), these enterprises have lent a net 46 colones (after subtracting 
their informal borrowing) in informal transactions primarily with their business clients. The 
ratio calculated following identical method for enterprise-intermediaries is almost 4 to 1, 
about 9 times higher than that shown by enterprise-users. Enterprise-intermediaries hold 
in net informal sector assets four times the value of their net debt with banks, which 
suggests that these enterprises use large amounts of their own resources for informal 
lending. In summary, all enterprises (users as well as intermediaries) perform an important 
financial intermediation role, and are essential in the transmission of liquidity from the 
institutional sector to the informal sector. 
The preceding analysis documented the close relationship between formal and 
informal finance. The ratios reported in the right hand column, lines 3 and 4 of Table 2 can 
be interpreted as transmission coefficients between the two sectors. Institutional credit 
translates into informal loans to households and enterprises primarily through the activity 
of non-financial enterprises at the rate of 0.82 to 1. Informal loans granted in the economy 
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then "find their way back" into the formal sector through the household preference for bank 
deposits, further forced by the absence of informal depository opportunities. Liquidity does 
flow between the formal and informal financial sectors, therefore policies that affect 
monetary volumes will transmit from one sector to another with relative ease, instead of 
affecting solely the institutional sector. 
The apparent integration of interest rate and term structures in the credit market 
discussed above suggests that at least a subset of financial market participants operate in 
both the formal and the informal sector. Hence, transmission of price signals is likely to 
occur every time financial price policies create arbitrage opportunities and incentives in 
either sector. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The pattern described above indicates a clear liquidity cycle from the formal sector, 
primarily through non-financial enterprises acting as primary borrowers from banks, to the 
informal sector where households as well as smaller firms obtain their liquidity. This 
pattern of liquidity circulation, along with the significant involvement of all sectors as 
depositors in the formal sector, and the heavy reliance of enterprises on institutional credit 
suggest that formal and informal finance in El Salvador are closely interrelated. 
Contractions or expansions of domestic credit will have an impact on informal 
financial flows primarily through their effect on enterprise credit. Likewise, changes in 
enterprise activity due to real sector shocks will affect enterprise informal financial interme-
diation, access to these services by households and other enterprises, and consequently 
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create secondary effects in the cycle of monetary circulation. These interrelationships and 
their significance should be recognized . and taken into consideration by policy makers 
responsible for the effectiveness of monetary and financial policies. 
TABLE 1 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL FINANCE IN OVERALL MONETARY BALANCES 
f:'9Pl.l1.ATIOl..jJOTAL$•.•.•· •. ••·. 
Sample proportions, % of pop. 0.88 0.17 4.50 % 
INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT 8,761.4 382,625.3 8,072,155.6 8,463,542.2 70.1% 
of which, from Banks 4,340.9 220,338.2 6,295,980.0 6,520,659.1 54.0% 
INFORMAL CREDIT 16,779.8 262,021.8 3,333,995.6 3,612,797.1 29.9% 
of which, from Enterprises• 12,016.5 159,930.6 3,160, 755.6 3,332,702.6 27.6% 
!14<!.El:47f ·····l91:0t!~.li1): ••••• ,~;ll71!,33~:~······· ·t . 100.0% 
Shares by User Group, % 0.1% 3.0% 94.5% 100.0% 
ANANCIAL~r=:f~,(,)'Q()Q•• •· . 
INFORMAL LOANS 3,276.6 178,810.0 5,168,142.2 5,350,228.8 
of which, to Clients 1,180.3 52,545.3 4,525,637.8 4,579,363.4 
to Family & Friends 2,057.7 71,205.9 139,900.0 213,163.6 
DEPOSITS IN INSTITUTIONS 18,520.7 4,096,705.9 2,422,971.1 6,538,197.7 
of which, in Banks 16,917.8 3,888,213.5 2,286,984.4 6,192,115.8 
OTHER DEPOSITS (Informal) 269.9 10,540.0 10,771.1 21,581.0 
TOfAL FINANCIAL ASSETS I 22,067.2 4,288,055~9 't,ilOl,884.4 
Shares by User Groups, % 0.1% 23.8% 63.8% 100.0% 
Source: Cuevas, Graham, and Paxton. Extrapolation based on sample totals (Tables 4, 5 and 6) and sample proportions indicated abowt. 
' Includes supplier credit to enterprise-users. 
44.9% 
38.4% 
1.8% 
54.9% 
52.0% 
0.2% 
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TABLE 2 
SELECTED .ASSET TO DEBT RATIOS FOR THE USER POPULATION 
1. Bank Deposits Held 17.38 0.36 
to Bank Loans Received 
2. Informal Credit Granted 0.65 1.55 
to Informal Loans Received 
3. Bank Deposits Held 14.01 0.69 
to Informal Loans Received 
4. Informal Credit Granted 0.81 0.82 
to Bank Loans Received 
Source: Table 1. 
• Ratios for Enterprise-Intermediaries are, from top to bottom, 0.29, 4.91, 0.51, and 2.80. 
Figure 1 
Formal and Informal Finance: Interest Rate Structure, Overall Ranges of Loan Rates 
Interest Rates (percent per year) 
BorrO>Ner Source 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Rural Household Formal 
Informal 
Urban Household Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise - Users Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise - Intermediaries Formal 
Informal 
Cooperatives Formal 
Informal 
Individual Intermediaries Formal 
Informal 
0.95 
1.48 
1.71 
0.82 
100 110 120+ 
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Figure 2 
Formal and Informal Finance: Term Structure of loans, Overall Ranges 
Term (months) 
Borrower Source 0 10 20 30 40 50 60+ 
Rural Household Formal 
Informal 
Urban Household Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise - Users Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise - Intermediaries Formal 
Informal 
Cooperatives Formal 
Informal 
Individual Intermediaries Formal 
Informal 
Figure 3 
Formal and Informal Finance: Collateral Requirements in loan Contracts 
A. Mortgage Collateral (percent of the Sample) 
Borro.wr Source 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Rural Household Formal 
Urban Household 
Enterprise - Users Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise - Intermediaries Formal 
. 
Informal 
Cooperatives Formal l:t.: 
Informal .j! 
Individual Intermediaries Formal ~:::· 
8. No Collateral (percent of Sample) 
Borrower Source 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Rural Household Formal 
Informal 
Urban Household Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise - Users Formal 
Informal 
Enterprise • Intermediaries Formal 
Informal 
Cooperatives Formal 
Informal 
Individual Intermediaries Formal 
Informal 
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